

8 November 1973

*Morning meeting*

0174/1

STATINTL

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]

SUBJECT: : Murphy Commission

1. I delivered the DCI response to the Murphy Commission letter this morning. They asked if I could have prepared a generalized "wiring diagram" of the Community for them to send to the Commissioners. I have graphics working up a modified version of one I found in a Harry A. Ransom book on intelligence, and will deliver it on Friday, 9 November.

2. The DCI has asked me to express to Fisher Howe his desire to bring along [redacted] on 19 November. I did so, and Howe did not reject the idea out of hand. Nonetheless, in the context of his explanation of how the Commission works and what the Commissioners expect, I think Mr. Colby should appear alone.

3. Howe stressed first that the Commission's hearings were extremely informal. He said several times that he feared Mr. Colby would view them as an "investigation," and that this was not at all the way in which the Commission has acted. He said that it is unlikely that any detailed questions will be asked beyond those relating to how much effort (\$ or people) was expended on broad categories of activity such as collection and production. He said that the Commissioners really want an informal discussion with Mr. Colby alone about how intelligence supports policy and about where it fits in the organization of the government for that purpose. Howe stressed that expert witnesses and lots of backup notebooks would interfere with the general approach of the Commission, and asked that I make certain that Mr. Colby understood that no one was going to cross-examine him. He suggested that when a matter was more in the bailiwick of Defense, that Mr. Colby say so and leave the matter for the Commission to pursue with [redacted]

4. Howe was willing to accept the DCI statement as a comprehensive response for now, and to follow it up with questions during or after the 19 November hearings. If there are matters which they specifically want to cover in more detail, they will let us know so that we can prepare Mr. Colby.

Dept of State review(s) completed.  
NSC Referral Not Required

5. The Commission's witness schedule is a bit up in the air now because of Mr. Colby's proposal to bring along [redacted] [redacted] They would like to know as soon as possible whether he will consent to come alone (with one or two staff if he wishes), so that they can firm up their program. Again, in the context of what I heard Fisher Howe say, I think Mr. Colby would actually be better off on his own before the Commission.

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[redacted]

Gary Foster

P.S.

I've passed these thoughts orally to John Warner. He suggests that General Graham should bring this up at the DCI morning meeting on 9 November.

The "Murphy Commission"

1. The Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy receives its authority from the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972 (PL 92-392 July 13, 1972). It is a joint Presidential-Congressional Commission (membership at Tab A).

2. The Commission is charged to submit to the Congress and the President findings and recommendations to provide a more effective system for the formulation and implementation of the Nation's foreign policy. The Commission is to study and investigate the organization, methods of operation, and powers of all departments, agencies, independent establishments, and instrumentalities of the government which participate in the formulation and implementation of US foreign policy.

3. The Commission is authorized to hold hearings, subpoena witnesses and secure information directly from any executive department or agency. It may make recommendations with respect to the reorganization of the departments, the achievement of better executive-legislative co-ordination, the improvement of procedures, and the abolition of services, activities and functions not necessary to the efficient conduct of foreign policy.

4. In its "Tentative Program" the Commission said: "In anticipation of their appearances before the Commission, and to assist in the exploration of the subject, departments, agencies, and experts will be asked to submit reports addressing important questions into which the Commission will want to delve."

5. The original plan was to conduct hearings on the Intelligence Community in February 1974, but that date has been changed to 19 November 1973. This is only a small part of the Commission's entire program. My source tells me that the State Department and its subsidiaries are the subject of much greater interest. Indeed, on 15 and 16 October the Commission took testimony from USIA, AID, and the Peace Corps. Following the DCI, but not in this order, will be the NSC, OMB and the White House, Defense (17 December), State (when Kissinger can make it), the Congressional process, and so forth. There have already been some preliminary hearings with State.

6. The Staff of the Commission is arranged as follows:

- a. State - Bill Bacchus
- b. Defense - Paul Schratz (Capt, USN, Ret.)
- c. Congress - Roger Majak
- d. Intelligence - Tom Reckford ( [REDACTED] )
- e. Asst. General Counsel - [REDACTED]
- f. Staff members at large - Margie Vanderhye and Bill Carter (son of Ambassador Beverley Carter - Tanzania).

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7. The major interest in the Intelligence Community is to determine how it serves the policymaker. To do this the Commission will examine organization, procedures, relationships, and authorities. It is not yet clear how many witnesses will be called from the Intelligence Community.

8. When the law was written, the Agency managed to insert in the House version language which gave the DCI the right to protect sources and methods. OLC is digging this out for me. It appears, however, that on most grounds the Commission has all of the authority it needs to ask questions and expect good answers.

Attachment

TAB A

Commission Members

The Commission is composed of 12 members; four each appointed by the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and the President. The members are:

President	THE HONORABLE ROBERT D. MURPHY - <u>Chairman</u> Corning Glass International New York, New York
Senate	THE HONORABLE JAMES B. PEARSON - <u>Vice Chairman</u> United States Senate
President	DR. DAVID M. ABSHIRE Chairman, Center of Strategic & International Studies, Georgetown University
President	MRS. ANNE ARMSTRONG Counsellor to the President White House
President	THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Department of State
Senate	MRS. CHARLES W. ENGLEHARD, JR. Far Hills, New Jersey
House	MR. AREND D. LUBBERS President, Grand Valley State College Allendale, Michigan
Senate	MR. FRANK C. P. McGLINN Executive Vice President Fidelity Bank Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

House        THE HONORABLE WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD  
                 House of Representatives

Senate       THE HONORABLE MIKE MANSFIELD  
                 United States Senate

House        DR. STANLEY P. WAGNER  
                 President, East Central State College  
                 Ada, Oklahoma

House        THE HONORABLE CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI  
                 House of Representatives

COMMISSION STAFF

FRANCIS O. WILCOX - Executive Director  
of the Commission

FISHER HOWE - Deputy Executive Director

WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR. - General Counsel  
to the Commission

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# OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

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## Remarks:

☐ - Attached is a copy of two statements which  prepared, with the help of OLC, and which the DCI OKd for passing to Senator McClellan. I was told by OLC that  passed these to McClellan's staff man yesterday.

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

Responding to my own concern--as well as to that expressed by others--as to the charter of the Central Intelligence Agency and the degree of control exercised over its activities, I have reviewed the National Security Council Intelligence Directives--the so-called NSCIDs-- and conferred at length with the Director of Central Intelligence.

I am convinced the National Security Council clearly runs the CIA.

The statutory responsibilities of the CIA, as set forth in Section 102 (d) of the National Security Act of 1947, and the enabling authority for implementation of these statutory responsibilities as contained in the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 provide clear basis for the NSCIDs.

In general, these National Security Council directives amplify the statutory responsibilities of the DCI and the organizations which constitute the U.S. intelligence community by describing the allocation of functions and delineating the responsibilities of the various departments and agencies in the collection, processing and production of foreign intelligence.

The CIA is directly accountable to Presidential authority and control and the machinery exists for exercising this control. This is done primarily by elements of the National Security Council structure, but the President himself participates directly as needed.



The Office of Management and Budget reviews the CIA budget on a line-by-line basis.

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board reviews for the President the foreign intelligence activities of the Government, including those of the CIA.

Separate committees of the Senate and House of Representatives--Armed Services and Appropriations--review CIA's programs and provide for its appropriations.

We all recognize that serious problems are involved in the operation of a secret intelligence organization in a democracy and that there is need for continuing attention to insure that statutory and other built-in controls hold to a minimum the inherent contradiction between democratic principles and intelligence methods.

Those controls exist.

I am convinced that the Director of Central Intelligence clearly understands and fully accepts that the CIA and the intelligence community as a whole exist to serve the legitimate needs of the government and undertake what the government asks them to do only under the directives and controls which the government has established.

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AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

1. The authorities and responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence derive from four sources:

- a. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 402, 403)
- b. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
- c. Directives from the President
- d. National Security Council Intelligence Directives

2. Statutory responsibilities of the CIA and its place in the Government structure are set forth in Section 102 (d) of the National Security Act, which states:

"For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the [Central Intelligence] Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council -

"(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;

"(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

"(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: Provided further, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence: And provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

"(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

"(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

3. The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 provides the Central Intelligence Agency with enabling authority for the implementation of the statutory responsibilities listed in the National Security Act by:

(1) exempting the Agency, in the interest of "the security of the foreign intelligence activities of the United States," from such existing Federal laws as require "the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency";

(2) specifying that the appropriations or other moneys made available to the Agency "may be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds"; and that "for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified";

(3) permitting CIA to transfer to and receive from other Government agencies such sums as may be approved by the Office of Management and Budget (formerly the Bureau of the Budget) for the performance of the functions and activities authorized by the National Security Act, and other agencies are permitted to receive from or transfer to the Agency such sums;

(4) providing that when the Director, the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization determine that the entry of a particular alien into the United States for permanent residence "is in the interest of national security or essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission," the alien and his immediate family shall be given entry into the United States for permanent residence, but not more than one hundred persons may be given entry under this authority annually.

4. A number of presidential and National Security Council directives have been issued to amplify the statutory authorities and responsibilities of the DCI.

5. The most important Presidential directive pertaining to the organization and management of the U.S. foreign intelligence community is his memorandum of 5 November 1971, which reflected an exhaustive study undertaken at the President's direction by the Office of Management and Budget with participation by the National Security Council staff, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the President's Science Advisor, and organizations of the intelligence community.

6. The President's objectives in issuing this memorandum were to ensure:

- Continuing review of the responsiveness of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort to national needs.
- Strengthened leadership for the intelligence community as a whole.
- More efficient use of resources in the collection of intelligence information.
- Elimination of less efficient or outmoded activities.
- Improvement in the quality, scope and timeliness of intelligence information.

7. To this end he assigned an enhanced leadership role for the Director of Central Intelligence in planning, reviewing, coordinating and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities, and in the production of national intelligence.

8. The President's directive established an Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee to advise the DCI on the preparation each year of a consolidated intelligence program budget. Members of the IRAC include the DCI as chairman, and senior representatives of the Department of State, Department of Defense, and Office of Management and Budget.

9. The President also reconstituted the United States Intelligence Board to include a representative of the Secretary of the Treasury. The USIB is charged with advising and assisting the DCI with respect to the production of national intelligence, the establishment of national intelligence requirements and priorities, the supervision of the

dissemination and security of intelligence materials, and the protection of intelligence sources and methods. Its present members are the Director of Central Intelligence (Chairman); Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency (Vice Chairman); Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Director, National Security Agency; Director, Division of International Security Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission; Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury.

10. The responsibility of the DCI for the budget of the entire intelligence community extends to recommending to the President through the Office of Management and Budget the general level and composition of the budget and the appropriate distribution of resources among the different programs. The DCI does not "control" the budgets of intelligence elements in other departments of the Government, but, through a variety of mechanisms and authorities, he can exercise leadership of the intelligence community in the manner directed by the President.

11. Presidential directives to the DCI can be in several forms, both written and oral. Since the DCI serves as the principal advisor to the President and the National Security Council on all matters of foreign intelligence related to the national security, he is present either by invitation or as a member of a variety of high-level groups and committees at which Presidential instructions can be made known. Government needs for intelligence estimates on particular subjects are frequently surfaced at such meetings.

12. The National Security Act of 1947 specifically provides that the National Security Council shall issue directives pursuant to the Act. The National Security Council Intelligence Directives are classified and since they are National Security Council documents, the DCI has no authority to declassify or release them.

13. In general, these directives describe the allocation of functions and delineate the responsibilities of the various departments and agencies, which constitute the intelligence community, in the collection, processing and production of foreign intelligence.

14. The following comments cover in general the functions and responsibilities of the Agency and relate to a number of questions concerning CIA activities which have been raised recently in the Congress and elsewhere:

a. The National Security Act of 1947 prohibits CIA from exercising any "police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal security functions," but CIA must necessarily be involved in certain domestic activities in pursuance of its foreign intelligence mission. These include:

(1) Headquarters and administrative activities involving procurement of supplies essential to foreign intelligence operations, personnel recruitment, security clearances, training, and the like.

(2) Interviewing American citizens on a knowing voluntary basis for their knowledge of foreign intelligence which they will share with their Government.

(3) Collection of foreign intelligence from foreigners temporarily resident in the U.S.

(4) Developing the facilities, mechanisms and relationships required within the United States to support foreign intelligence operations abroad.

(5) Conducting analysis and research of foreign intelligence matters by CIA staff and contractors, consultants and institutions.

b. The CIA passes the results of foreign intelligence operations to other appropriate U.S. agencies which have a legitimate interest therein. This support involves such activities as:

(1) Advising the FBI of the imminent arrival in the U.S. of foreign personnel in whose activities the FBI has an interest.

(2) Passing to the Drug Enforcement Administration the results of intelligence operations abroad which reveal information on illicit drug traffic.

(3) Reporting to appropriate authorities evasion of U.S. export controls as learned by foreign intelligence operations.

c. The Central Intelligence Agency is directly accountable to Presidential authority and control. By law, CIA operates under the direction of the National Security Council, which the President chairs. The Office of Management and Budget reviews the CIA budget on a line-by-line basis. In addition, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board reviews for the President the foreign intelligence activities of the Government, including those of the CIA. Separate Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives (Armed Services and Appropriations) review CIA's programs and budget and provide for its appropriations. From time to time, other committees of the Congress receive information from the Agency on matters within their jurisdiction.

d. In matters directly affecting the security of the United States, the President and the National Security Council want what is termed "national intelligence" -- evaluations which reflect the considered and agreed judgment of all the major foreign intelligence components of the United States Government. Seeing that this national intelligence is produced and disseminated is the responsibility and the primary function of the Director of Central Intelligence. National intelligence is focused on the needs of the top policy making levels of the government and such additional foreign intelligence as any department or agency requires to execute its particular mission is produced as departmental intelligence.

e. The CIA makes its unique contribution because of its separation from policy formulation matters. All of the departments of government which have components in the U.S. foreign intelligence community have responsibilities for the formulation of policy; CIA has none. The CIA is the only organization whose primary mission is to collect, evaluate and produce foreign intelligence.

f. In addition to the other responsibilities which it assigns to CIA, the National Security Act of 1947 provides that CIA shall perform "such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." This language was designed to enable the CIA to conduct such foreign activities as the national government may wish to assign to what can best be described as a "secret service". These activities are undertaken only at the direction of the National Security Council.

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<b>Remarks:</b>  NOTE: FOR DISCUSSION AT TOMORROW 17 Oct Staff Meeting . (I have handcarried cy to <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px;"></div> .  <i>See attached material previously recd.</i>				
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**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
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SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks:

**Mr. Houston will raise this at the  
 Morning Meeting tomorrow.**

Executive Secretary

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Date

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MEMORANDUM FOR

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
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STATINTL

October 17, 1973

  
General Graham:

As a result of this morning's DCI meeting, the IC staff has responsibility for the Director's response to the Murphy Committee on government. Mr. Colby chooses to use as a point of departure his confirmation transcript ~~and to use that as a starting point~~ for writing a narrative which responds to the various questions. All of the response is to be unclassified with a comment at the end that there is a good deal of classified background to what has been presented.

It is Mr. Colby's intention that this will not be a large document. Nothing was stated, but I have the feeling that something like ten pages is what is desired. The OGC has prepared some material already and would like an opportunity to contribute to the paper that is developed.

I suggest we have a preliminary IC meeting on this and then with OGC. The meeting of the Director with the Murphy Committee is in November and the chairman of the committee has asked for written inputs by November 19.

 STATINTL

OK  
1. Have quick and summary prepared -  
2. Get GP Chief comment.  
3. Final OK for my app.  
G 10/17

## DIRECTOR'S

## Routing Slip

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	13	ASST/DCI	✓		
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10/3

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

We must work out a modus operandi for this exercise, to include executive sessions, limits of inquiry into sources & methods, etc - Could we discuss at a.m. mtg to start a letter to Paul Murphy with

DIRECTOR + PF118  
HAK

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

note to

I send this a.m. came  
back from them with  
[redacted] vs. note:

"Don't let [redacted] work too  
hard 1st time around"

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STATINTL

19 October 1973

[redacted]  
Re AD/DCI/IC note of 17 Oct. on IC  
responsibility to prepare strawman in  
response to Murphy Commission.

STATINTL

I have scheduled a meeting with  
[redacted] OGC, O/PPB on this subject  
and on formulating a response to the  
Commission's requests to Bill. [redacted]

STATINTL

will begin with a review of the  
Director's testimony at confirmation  
hearing which should provide a key  
input to our response and with  
simplicity DCI has requested. He  
will coordinate a draft response  
inside IC Staff.

ILLEGIB

I will keep you both advised  
and produce a product in the course  
of the next 10 days or so.

STATINTL

JMC

✓cc: [redacted]

STATINTL

EYES ONLY

[redacted] : You have  
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STAT already seen the Murphy  
STATINTL letter [redacted] refers to.

Mr. [redacted] has now seen this and the letter

16 October 1973

STATINTL

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]

SUBJECT : Murphy Commission

1. The DCI will shortly receive a letter containing questions which the Commission would like answered. They will range from the conceptual to the specific, and are designed to furnish background for the Commissioners when Colby testifies before them. (Now scheduled for 19 November; Colby only at this point.) Many of the questions will have to do with the community. I'll have a bootleg copy of the letter within a few days. Original is being sent to OGC.

2. Tom Reckford had a meeting with OGC last week. He found the attitude toward the Commission to be one of openness and a willingness to help. Tom also talked to Arnie Donahue about the questions to be asked. He found Donahue to be less helpful; he recommended that Reckford restrict the scope of the questions and the hearings.

3. It is not yet clear where [redacted] Allen, [redacted] and Cline fit into the Commission's plans.

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STATINTL

EYES ONLY

STAT

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ILLEGIB

4 October 1973

STATINTL

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Murphy Commission

I had a meeting this morning with Tom Reckford of the staff of the Commission. Tom's account is the Intelligence Community.

The Commission plans to hold meetings on intelligence in November. Colby will be called. Tom is in the process of drafting a written request to Colby for information so that the Commission will have some background when it takes testimony from him.

The attached is Tom's current draft. I think it will be modified substantially before it is sent. Since the Commission's charge is to study the organization of the government for the conduct of foreign policy, there will probably be some additional questions on organization and management.

Tom is new to this whole community business and does not know quite which way to move. He wondered who should be invited to testify besides Colby. I suggested [REDACTED] They may also ask Allen and [REDACTED]

STAT


The Commission will meet in Senator Mansfield's offices to take testimony. Mansfield is all hot to get dollar figures for the community exposed at least to the Commission--if not to the public. He has entered some figures in the record already--indicating

STATINTL

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I encouraged Tom to get permission to come out for a generalized briefing on the community. When Colby met last week with Francis Wilcox and Fisher Howe (Staff Director and Deputy Staff Director), he made O/GC the official contact, and offered every assistance. If Reckford had more background, he could probably formulate better questions.



STATINTL

STATINTL

P. S. I've asked  to look over the attached to see whether he has suggestions which might help orient the letter to Colby.

PRELIMINARY DRAFT - LETTER TO W. COLBY

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In preparing for such a meeting, the Commission believes it would be especially useful to have a statement from you which it could study in advance and thus make the discussion more profitable. We hope that your statement will touch upon the following questions, in addition to any other matters which you regard as of major importance.

I. In your capacity as Director of Central Intelligence, how do you define your responsibilities with regard to the entire intelligence community? For instance:

-- To what extent do you now have the authority to determine the budget and manpower needs of the various agencies?

-- How do you go about reducing duplication and ensuring cooperation between the community components?

-- What are the positive and negative aspects of having several agencies competing in the collection and analysis of certain subjects, such as military-strategic matters?

-- In your current reorganization of the process by which National Intelligence Estimates are written and coordinated, how do you propose to ensure the continued objectivity of the analysis? To deal with institutional biases, dissents, and the drafting itself?

-- How is the Intelligence Community adjusting to the President's directives on declassification and downgrading procedures? What problems do you foresee in maintaining tight security and preventing unauthorized leaks in the future?

I. With respect to the CIA, how do you see its mission changing in 1970s? For example,

-- In the aftermath of the Cold War, is the CIA changing its basic priorities and targets? How is the CIA adapting to new demands for intelligence on such subjects as economic matters, energy problems, the environment, the narcotics business, etc.?

-- What are the major organizational and operational problems you have encountered? Approved For Release 2003/04/25 : CIA-RDP80M01133A001000060022-8  
legislative action or some other initiative to strengthen or improve the position of the DCI? ①

ILLEGIB

--- In an atmosphere of international detente, and at a time when  
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the nature and scope of such programs are under frequent attack within the US, do you see a continuing need for covert action operations? If so, should they be handled in the same agency as intelligence collection and analysis? What criteria should be established before the approval of covert action?

--- What is the extent of the CIA's domestic activities and operations? Do you see a need for new procedures or limits on such activities? How would you categorize the CIA's current relationship with the FBI?

*misleading, no answer*  
--- Is the CIA keeping up with the latest technological innovations, including the use of computers? Are you confident that the CIA can monitor the SALT Agreements, present and future?

--- How do the CIA's principal consumers levy requests on the Agency? Is there sufficient communication back and forth with the White House? Are you confident that key policy makers understand the role that exposure to intelligence can play in policy formulation? To what extent does the CIA have to sell its analytical products?

--- How does the CIA come up with collection requirements for Stations overseas? Can this process be improved so that users are obliged to state what they need, and field elements are persuaded to take requirements more seriously? Does the CIA have any difficulty in dealing with the masses of data it receives daily?

III. Within the government, what are the checks and balances on CIA activities? For instance,

-- How is the 40 Committee composed and how is it determined which covert activities will be submitted to it for approval?

-- How often are you called upon to discuss organizational matters with the Armed Services and Appropriations' Committees in the House and Senate?

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-- How does the CIA keep the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board informed of its activities, and how responsive is the CIA to recommendations of the Board?

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to approval by the Ambassadors? Do some Ambassadors prefer to remain ignorant of CIA initiatives?

-- To what extent do you think the CIA should be accountable to the general public? Would it be useful to the Agency to make an effort to improve its public image?

IV. What do you see as the principal obstacles, in terms of organization, procedures, and institutions, to the CIA's internal efficiency and performance? For example:

-- How do you reconcile the need for compartmentation, for security reasons, with the principle of cross-fertilization?

-- How would you characterize the quality of communication, both upward and downward, within the CIA? How could it be improved?

-- Do you believe that the Agency has become increasingly bureaucratized over the years? How do you make sure that individual employees and offices do not settle into rigid patterns of behavior?

-- Does the CIA have a problem these days in recruiting and retaining the kinds of employees it needs?

-- What steps is the CIA taking to provide equal opportunity employment for women and minority groups? How many women and Blacks have reached the grade, GS-15?

-- What is the CIA policy on selection-out? On making sure that its best young officers get ahead rapidly?

STAT

16 October 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : Murphy Commission

1. The DCI will shortly receive a letter containing questions which the Commission would like answered. They will range from the conceptual to the specific, and are designed to furnish background for the Commissioners when Colby testifies before them. (Now scheduled for 19 November; Colby only at this point.) Many of the questions will have to do with the community. I'll have a bootleg copy of the letter within a few days. Original is being sent to OGC.

2. [REDACTED] had a meeting with OGC last week. He found the attitude toward the Commission to be one of openness and a willingness to help. [REDACTED] also talked to Arnie Donahue about the questions to be asked. He found Donahue to be less helpful; he recommended that [REDACTED] restrict the scope of the questions and the hearings.

3. It is not yet clear where [REDACTED] Allen, [REDACTED] and Cline fit into the Commission's plans.

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DCI/IC/CCG [REDACTED] (16 October 1973)

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